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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy com-
petition. Our primary result is that increasing ‘relocation’ mobility of ﬁrms
leads to increasing ‘net’ tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While
enhanced relocation mobility intensiﬁes tax competition, it weakens subsidy
competition. The resulting fall in the governments’ subsidy payments over-
compensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues.
We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are ﬁrst en-
gaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and ﬁrms
locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.
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In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in international tax and subsidy com-
petition for ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we distinguish between two diﬀerent concepts of
mobility - ‘location’ and ‘relocation’ mobility. The ﬁrst concept, location mobility,
refers to the additional costs that accrue to investors when they set up a new ﬁrm or
plant in a foreign country rather than in their home country. The second concept,
relocation mobility, refers to the costs that arise when an already established ﬁrm
or plant moves to another jurisdiction. These two types of mobility jointly shape
the countries’ subsidy and tax competition. They thus aﬀect each country’s ‘net’
tax revenues, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a government’s tax revenues and its
subsidy payments.
Our primary result is that increasing relocation mobility leads to increasing net
tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. We derive this conclusion in a four-
stage model in which two symmetric jurisdictions compete for ﬁrms with subsidies
and taxes, each aiming at maximising its net revenues. In the ﬁrst stage, the non-
cooperative governments simultaneously set subsidies for attracting investors. In
the second stage, the investors decide where they will set up their ﬁrms and receive
subsidies. After subsidies have been phased out, in the third stage governments
simultaneously choose corporate taxes. In the fourth stage, ﬁrms decide whether to
stay or to relocate, and pay taxes accordingly.
A key feature of the model is that investors face location costs in the second stage,
reﬂecting imperfect location mobility, and relocation costs in the fourth stage, re-
ﬂecting imperfect relocation mobility. The location costs, i.e., the cost disadvantage
from investing abroad, imply that investors are, on average, home biased. This is
an empirically well established result (e.g., French and Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999;
Pinkowitz et al., 2001). The relocation costs imply that ﬁrms are, in general, ‘locked
in’ once they are operating in a country because, for instance, they develop ties with
the regional economy and acquire location-speciﬁc knowledge. Reversing the initial
location choice is possible but costly. The resulting lock-in eﬀect allows governments
to levy higher taxes on ﬁrms than is otherwise possible, and it provides incentives
to pay subsidies to attract new ﬁrms in the ﬁrst place.
Surprisingly, a decline in relocation costs leads to a rise in net revenues in the
two countries under ‘reasonable’ assumptions although it weakens the lock-in eﬀect
and intensiﬁes tax competition. This outcome occurs because the induced fall in
taxes weakens the preceding subsidy competition and is more than oﬀset by the
resulting decline in subsidy payments. By contrast, a decline in location costs neg-
atively aﬀects each country’s net revenues, since it intensiﬁes subsidy competition
without weakening tax competition. It thus increases government payments without
1enhancing revenues.
Distinguishing between location and relocation costs allows us to disentangle
the diﬀerent channels through which the diﬀerent types of mobility aﬀect net tax
revenues. This is particularly important, because we cannot expect the two types
of mobility costs to decrease in line with one another, since the decline in location
costs is at least partly driven by forces other than those which determine the decline
in relocation costs. We now brieﬂy illustrate this point.
Let us ﬁrst look at the initial location choice. Investors are, on average, home
biased. For a variety of reasons, they prefer to set up new ﬁrms or plants in their
home region. There are, for instance, international information asymmetries which
mean that even large investors are simply better informed about the economic and
legal conditions at home than abroad, and this leads to higher transaction costs and
greater uncertainties for foreign direct investments (FDIs). This feature is captured
by our location costs.
These costs, however, have been decreasing in recent years. International legal
and economic harmonisation, the progress of communication and information tech-
nologies, and the liberalisation of the world capital markets are the main reasons
for this decline. All these measures make the international movement of ﬁnancial
capital less costly and less risky, thereby facilitating foreign investments.
Next, let us consider brieﬂy the relocation choice. Relocation is an option, but
it causes substantial opportunity costs. A ﬁrm often forges strong links with local
business networks and suppliers and acquires location-speciﬁc knowledge once it has
become established in a region. Local links and knowledge are both worthless in
the case of relocation. Also, relocation requires not only the transfer of ﬁnancial
capital, but also the movement of real capital goods and human capital, which is
particularly costly.
Nevertheless, we argue that the relocation costs have also been declining over
time. Consider the case of a smaller high-tech or services ﬁrm initially located in, say,
the Netherlands.1 The main assets of such smaller ﬁrms in the high-tech and services
sectors are often their highly skilled employees with a very product-speciﬁc know-
how, who cannot easily be replaced. In this case, the introduction of the common
European labour market substantially reduced the costs of relocating such a ﬁrm,
including its key employees, to adjacent Belgium. Additionally, the development of
modern communication and transportation technologies and the internationalisation
1This ﬁrm might be an academic or corporate spin-oﬀ, or a ‘regular’ start-up. In the late 1990s,
almost 1.8 million start-ups were established in eight European OECD countries in one year,
compared to approximately 1.1 million closures. About 230,000 of the start-ups were corporate
spin-oﬀs. See Moncada-Patern` o-Castello et al. (2000) and, for further discussion on spin-oﬀs from
public sector research institutions, Callan (2001).
2of the former national economies have been diminishing the role of the established
local networks.
Alternatively, consider the case of large ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry.
Here the pace of the technological progress has, in some sense, substantially reduced
relocation costs. In this industry, the development has been so dynamic that product
life cycles are nowadays extremely short. They are, in fact, now measured in months
(cf. Henisz and Macher, 2004). Consequently, new production lines are set up very
frequently, for example, in order to produce a new generation of microprocessors.
Once production facilities have to anyway be replaced, it is only a small step to
relocate, or rather replace, the entire factory. In this sense, the relocation costs have
been declining as a result of the accelerating speed of technological innovations.
These costs are, in general, still positive, given the partial loss of a skilled workforce
and the other downsides of relocation. But the crucial point here is the general
downward trend.
The semiconductor industry also provides a striking example for the relevance of
considering subsidy competition along with tax competition. Subsidy payments to
this industry are common (Henisz and Macher, 2004). For instance, the AMD Fab
36 project in Dresden in 2003 was oﬃcially subsidised by almost e550 million (cf.
Grundig et al., 2008). Now, only a few years later, the future of AMD in Dresden is
very uncertain as a result of low relocation costs. Politicians and the public, having
noticed that the lock-in eﬀect is much weaker than initially thought, are more and
more critical of such subsidies. And this is in line with our model.2
Our paper is related to the ‘tax holiday’ literature. In this strand of literature,
governments initially grant tax holidays, or upfront subsidies, to attract foreign
direct investments and to compensate ﬁrms for high time-consistent taxes in the
future (e.g., Bond and Samuelson, 1986; Doyle and van Wijnbergen, 1994; Janeba,
2002; Marjit et al., 1999; Thomas and Worrall, 1994). The resulting policy outcome
in these papers, i.e., subsidies or low taxes initially followed by high taxes, is similar
to our subsidy and tax structure. But, unlike these papers, we analyse the impact
of changes in location mobility and relocation mobility on net tax revenues. We
also examine how the mobility of ﬁrms aﬀects the strategic interactions between
the governments in the subsidy and tax stages. By contrast, the articles referred to
cannot explore this issue, as they either consider the unilateral policies of a single
2The German-based semiconductor memory producer Qimonda in its 2006 IPO prospectus
explicitly mentions that “[r]eductions in the amount of government subsidies we receive or demands
for repayment could increase our reported expenses. (...) The availability of government subsidies
is largely outside our control. (...) As a general rule, we believe that government subsidies are
becoming less available in each of the countries in which we have received funding in the past”
(Qimonda, 2006, pp. 26-27).
3host country or assume a large number of potential host countries, thus excluding
strategic interactions from the outset.3
Like our paper, the literature on tax competition in models of the ‘new economic
geography’ raises some doubts about whether increasing economic integration neces-
sarily erodes government revenues (for instance, Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck
and Pﬂ¨ uger, 2006; Kind et al., 2000). In this strand of literature, the arguments
hinge on the presence of signiﬁcant agglomeration economies, which are totally ab-
sent in our framework. By contrast, our conclusion that rising relocation mobility
does not harm the governments’ budgets follows from the interaction between tax
and subsidy competition, which is not considered in the ‘new economic geography’
literature.4
Konrad and Kovenock (2008) is related to both the tax holiday and the new eco-
nomic geography literature. They analyse tax competition for ‘overlapping FDIs’
in a dynamic model with agglomeration advantages. The vintage property of the
FDI prevents a ruinous race to the bottom as long as governments only have non-
discriminatory taxes at their disposal. But if governments can also oﬀer subsidies
to new FDI, international competition will again be “cut-throat in nature.” Konrad
and Kovenock (2008), however, are not interested in the implications of increasing
mobility. By contrast, we analyse how rising location and relocation mobility re-
shapes tax and subsidy competition, and how it ultimately aﬀects net tax revenues.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the basic set up of the model is
presented. Section 3 investigates the outcome of the subsidy and tax competition
stages. We analyse the eﬀects of increasing location and relocation mobility on net
revenues in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of some policy
implications.
2 Governments and Firms
We start by presenting our two-period, four-stage, model of tax and subsidy com-
petition for imperfectly mobile ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst period (consisting of the ﬁrst and
3Hauﬂer and Wooton (2006) analyse regional tax and subsidy coordination within an economic
union when the two members of this union compete with a third country. In their model, however,
each government has only one policy instrument at its disposal, which can be either a subsidy or a
corporate tax. Their paper thus diﬀers considerably from the tax holiday literature and from our
contribution.
4Wilson (2005) provides another argument that explains why tax competition can be welfare-
enhancing. In his model, the presence of tax competition implies that selﬁsh government oﬃcials
intensify their eﬀorts in expenditure competition in order to attract mobile capital, and this second
type of competition makes residents better oﬀ by reducing government “waste”.
4second stages; see below), the governments of two jurisdictions grant subsidies to
attract investors non-cooperatively. Given these subsidies, investors then decide
which country they will set up their ﬁrms in. In the second period (consisting of the
third and fourth stages), the two governments levy corporate taxes. Since the ﬁrms
are now established in a country, they are locked-in, but only imperfectly, as we will
explain in more detail below. Firms can still relocate in response to the tax policies
of the jurisdictions. So there is competition for mobile ﬁrms in both periods, albeit
to a diﬀerent degree.
Our framework draws on Haupt and Peters (2005). They, however, deal with
tax competition only. But since their model is very tractable, we can enrich the tax
competition stages and, more importantly, incorporate the new subsidy competition
stages. Let us now look at the model in more detail.
Firms Consider two symmetric countries, A and B. In each of these jurisdictions,
there is a continuum of home investors, normalised to 1. Here, the term ‘home’
refers to the fact that there are already some links between investors and a country.
For instance, the investors might simply reside in this country.
Each of the investors sets up a single ﬁrm. Despite these existing links, ﬁrms
can initially be located either in the investors’ home country or abroad. A ﬁrm’s
set up costs that occur in the ﬁrst period are c if it stays in its home country, and
c + m1 if it moves abroad. While all ﬁrms face identical cost components c, they
diﬀer with respect to their m1. (For notational convenience, ﬁrm indices are not
used.) We label the location costs m1 and interpret them as the mobility costs or
the cost disadvantage of investing abroad in the ﬁrst period. This characteristic
is distributed according to the distribution function F1(m1), whose properties are
described below.
In the second period, each ﬁrm realises the (gross) return π if it continues to
stay in the country where it was established in the ﬁrst period. Its return is π −m2
if it relocates in the second period. Again, π is the same for all ﬁrms, while the
component m2 diﬀers across ﬁrms. We label the relocation costs m2 and interpret
them as the mobility costs or the cost disadvantage of relocating in the second
period.5 Denote the ‘number’ or, more correctly, mass of ﬁrms which locate in
jurisdiction i in period 1 by Ni. Then, the characteristic m2 is distributed across
these Ni ﬁrms according to the new distribution function F2(m2).
The distribution functions F1(m1) and F2(m2) are twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and strictly increasing functions over the intervals [m1,m1] and [m2,m2],
5Relocation costs m2 can contain a cost component c2 that is identical for all relocation ﬁrms.
For simplicity, we ignore such a cost component. Analogously, we could set c equal to zero.
5respectively. They fulﬁl
Assumption 1:
(i) Fk(mk) = 0 and Fk(mk) = 1, k = 1,2, (ii) mk < 0 < mk, (iii) Fk(0) < 0.5,











Properties (i) and (ii) restrict the relevant domains of the distribution functions,
allowing for both positive and negative values of m1 and m2. In most cases, set
up costs are lower in an investor’s home region, since investors are more familiar
with their domestic business environment than with the foreign one. This situation
corresponds with a positive m1. But for some ﬁrms, set up costs are lower abroad.
They might be able to take advantage of a particularly specialised foreign labour
force. Or entrepreneurs might be able to make proﬁtable use of their business
ideas only in very speciﬁc places. For instance, a fashion label might be successful
only in cities such as New York or Paris. These cases are captured by a negative
m1. Property (iii), however, implies that the set up costs of the majority of ﬁrms
indeed favour their home country. Similarly, relocation costs m2 are positive for the
majority of ﬁrms. For instance, relocation after the start up phase causes the loss
of immobile input factors and regional networks built up in the ﬁrst period. This
relocation costs, however, need not be prohibitive. Firms are thus only imperfectly
locked in. Moreover, some ﬁrms might even beneﬁt from relocating and thus increase
their returns. They might, for instance, be closer to clients or suppliers.
Properties (iv) and (v) are most important for our analysis. They capture the
feature that second period mobility costs m2 exceed ﬁrst period mobility costs m1,
meaning that distribution function F2 lies to the right of F1, as illustrated in ﬁgure
1. In other words, ﬁrms become decreasingly mobile over their life span. This
‘natural’ assumption reﬂects the imperfect lock-in eﬀect once a ﬁrm is located in a
country. It drives our results. By contrast, the properties m1 < 0 and m2 < 0 are
not important for our economic mechanisms. In fact, our results would go through
with m1 = m2 = 0.6
Finally, property (vi) is a ‘purely technical’ restriction on the density functions’
slopes that guarantees well-behaved objective functions. A uniform distribution,
among others, fulﬁls this condition.
The functions F1 and F2 are common knowledge. Each ﬁrm learns about the
realisation of its speciﬁc location costs m1 and relocation costs m2 before it makes its
location decision in the ﬁrst period and its relocation decision in the second period,
6The ‘technical’ advantage of allowing negative mobility costs is that the distribution functions,
and thus the governments’ objective functions below, are ‘smooth’ for a wider range of tax and
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Figure 1: Distribution of location and relocation costs
respectively. For simplicity, we assume that a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period and second period
mobility costs are not correlated. This assumption enables us to put forward our
arguments as simply as possible.7
Governments When competing for mobile ﬁrms, the non-cooperative govern-
ments have subsidies and corporate taxes at their disposal. Subsidies are used in
period 1, while taxes are levied in period 2. Governments can implement preferential
subsidy and tax regimes. That is, in each country subsidies would then be diﬀerent
for ﬁrms of home investors that receive subsidy sn
i , and ‘incoming’ ﬁrms of foreign
investors that receive subsidy sm
i , where i = A,B. Similarly, governments might set
diﬀerentiated taxes. Firms that have already had their subsidised start up phase in
country i then pay tax tn
i , while those ﬁrms that relocate ‘newly’ to country i in the
second period pay tax tm
i .8
7In fact, it is far from clear whether location and relocation costs are correlated. Take the
example of a large, internationally experienced, investor. The location costs of this investor can be
minor. But if it sets up a steel factory, the relocation costs will be substantial - if not prohibitive.
Low location costs do not imply low relocation costs, and vice versa.
8A ﬁrm is ‘domestic’ in the country where it is set up, and it is taxed accordingly in the second
period. At this stage, a government discriminates between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, i.e., accord-
ing to the ﬁrms’ initial location, but it treats all domestically set up ﬁrms equally. Importantly,
in our setting, there are no incentives for governments to discriminate between domestic ﬁrms - as
deﬁned above - according to the home base of their investors.
7Figure 2: The timing of decisions
Objectives and Timing Each country maximises its ‘net’ revenues NRi, i.e.,
the diﬀerence between tax revenues Ri and subsidy payments Pi, given the decisions
of its opponent. As usual, investors maximise the net proﬁts of their ﬁrms, taking
into account (gross) return π, set up costs c, ﬁrm speciﬁc mobility costs m1 and m2,
subsidies sn
i and sm
j , and taxes tn
i and tm
j .
The precise timing of the subsidy and tax competition game between the two
governments is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the non-cooperative governments simul-




B. Given these subsidies, in the second stage
investors decide whether their ﬁrms locate and receive subsidies in either country A





B, again non-cooperatively. In the fourth stage, ﬁrms decide whether
they stay or relocate, and pay their taxes accordingly.
This decision structure is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. In terms of time periods, the
ﬁrst two stages can be interpreted as constituting period 1, the third and fourth
stages as constituting period 2. As mentioned above, the speciﬁc location costs
for each ﬁrm are revealed prior to the location decision at the beginning of the
second stage. Similarly, the relocation costs are revealed to each ﬁrm prior to the
relocation decision at the beginning of the fourth stage. The distribution of these
costs is common knowledge.
3 Subsidy and tax competition
As usual, we solve our model by backward induction, starting with the tax compe-
tition stages and then going on the subsidy competition stages.
3.1 Tax competition
The ﬁrms’ decisions in the fourth stage are straightforward. A ﬁrm that was set up
in region i in the ﬁrst period can stay in this region and receive net return π − tn
i
8(ﬁrst period costs and subsidies are sunk at this stage). Alternatively it can move
to region j and gain the net return π−m2−tm
j . A proﬁt maximising ﬁrm thus stays










i.e., if, and only if, the tax diﬀerential between the countries is smaller (strictly
larger) than the ﬁrm speciﬁc relocation costs. Consequently, the share of ﬁrms
relocating from region i to j is F2(tn
i − tm
j ).






















where Ni and Nj result from the ﬁrms’ decisions in the second stage. The ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side captures the tax revenues from all ﬁrms that were already
located in country i in the ﬁrst period (indicated by Ni) and stay there in the second
period.9 By contrast, the second term refers to the revenues from those ﬁrms that
were initially located in country j (indicated by Nj) and only enter country i in the
second period.
In the third stage, government i chooses taxes tn
i and tm
i that maximise revenues
Ri, given the choices of its competitor (previous subsidy payments Pi are sunk at

































i denote the elasticities of the respective tax bases. These elasticity
rules reﬂect the traditional trade-oﬀ: a higher tax rate increases the revenues from
the ﬁrms ultimately located in country i, but reduces the number of those ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst-order conditions (3) and (4) give the governments’ reaction functions
implicitly. The resultant equilibrium taxes are symmetric, i.e., tn
A = tn
B =: tn and
tm
A = tm
B =: tm, and given by
t
n =













1 − 2F2(tn − tm)
F 0
2(tn − tm)
=: ∆t > 0. (6)
9Recall that function F2 characterises the distribution of relocation costs of all ﬁrms whose start
up phase was in the same country, independent of their original home region.
10We can exclude tn − tm < 0, since this implies F2(tn − tm) < 0.5 and thus
[1 − 2F2(tn − tm)]/F0
2(tn − tm) > 0, which is obviously a contradiction. Therefore, tn − tm > 0
results (see Haupt and Peters, 2005).
9These solutions contain two important conclusions. First, government i’s tax on
ﬁrms already established in country i in the ﬁrst period exceeds the tax on ﬁrms
that move to region i only in the second period, i.e., tn > tm. This tax diﬀerential
arises because ﬁrms are locked in, at least imperfectly, once they have settled in a
country. Since ﬁrms respond less elastically to an increase in the ‘domestic’ tax tn
than to one in the ‘foreign’ tax tm, they end up with higher tax payments if they
stick to their initial location choice.
Second, taxes are independent of the number of ﬁrms Ni and thus independent
of subsidies. By contrast, the optimal subsidies in the ﬁrst stage are shaped by the
future taxes, as will soon become evident. In this sense, there is a one-way link
between tax and subsidy competition.
The equilibrium values (5) and (6) are analogous to the results in Haupt and Pe-
ters (2005). We derive these results in a more general setting than Haupt and Peters
(2005) with respect to mobility. More importantly, they only consider tax competi-
tion and completely ignore subsidy competition while we are interested precisely in
the relationship between tax and subsidy competition, and we analyse the resulting
net revenues. Let us therefore turn next to the subsidy competition between the
governments.
3.2 Subsidy competition
Since the tax tn
A (tm
A) is equal to tn
B (tm
B), and since the distributions of migration
costs m2 are the same in the two countries, a ﬁrm’s expected performance in the
second period is independent of its location in the ﬁrst period. The location choice
in the second stage, however, aﬀects a ﬁrm’s overall net proﬁt through its location
costs and received subsidy. A home investor of country i has net costs of c − sn
i
(c + m1 − sm
j ) in the ﬁrst period if its ﬁrm is set up in country i (country j). This










i.e., if, and only if, the subsidy diﬀerential between the countries is smaller (strictly
larger) than the ﬁrm speciﬁc location costs. The resultant share of i’s investors who
locate their ﬁrms in country j is F1(sm
j − sn
i ). Consequently, the number of ﬁrms



















where Hi is the number of i’s investors setting up their ﬁrms in country i and (1−Hj)
is the number of j’s investors locating their ﬁrms in country i.
10In the ﬁrst stage, each government chooses its subsidies sn
i and sm
i , given the
subsidies of its opponent. Government i maximises its net revenues
NRi = Ω
n [Hi + (1 − Hj)] + Ω
m [(1 − Hi) + Hj] − s
n
i Hi − s
m
i (1 − Hj), (9)
where Ωn := tn [1 − F2(tn − tm)] and Ωm := tmF2(tn − tm). The ﬁrst two terms on
the right-hand side capture future tax revenues while the third and the fourth term
give the subsidy payments to home and foreign investors.








































j) = 0. (11)
A marginal rise in the subsidies sn
i and sn
i increases government spending by the
number of recipients Hi and 1 − Hj, respectively. This negative eﬀect of today’s
subsidies on net revenues is captured by the ﬁrst term of each of the two derivatives.
By contrast, the second terms show the positive impact of today’s subsidies on
future revenues. Note that government i’s expected future tax revenue from a ﬁrm
is Ωn if this ﬁrm is set up in country i, but only Ωm if the ﬁrm is set up in country





m > 0. (12)
That is, country i’s revenue increase caused by attracting an additional investor in
the ﬁrst period is exactly equal to the positive tax diﬀerential. Taking into account
the subsidy payments, the net beneﬁt of attracting an additional home and foreign
investor is (tn − tm) − sn
i and (tn − tm) − sm




i ) and F 0
1(sm
i −sn
j) tell us how the number of ﬁrms established in country
i changes in response to a marginal rise in subsidies sn
i and sm
i .
There is also an alternative interpretation of the optimality conditions. Deﬁning
hypothetical taxes τn
i := (tn − tm)−sn
i and τm
i := (tn − tm)−sm
i , we can reformulate
























The similarity between the elasticity rules (3) and (4) on the one hand and (13) on
the other hand is striking and proves to be convenient later on.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the equilibrium subsidies and hypothetical taxes





B =: sm, etc.:
s
n = ∆t − τ
n, τ
n =












These equilibrium values have a straightforward interpretation. If there were no
tax diﬀerential ∆t, ﬁrms would have had to pay the hypothetical taxes τn and τm
in the ﬁrst period (cf. equilibrium taxes (5)). This tax is ‘cut’ by the expected
revenue diﬀerential (12). In this sense, governments give up current revenues for the
beneﬁt of having future ones. But only if the future gain tn − tm strictly exceeds
the hypothetical tax τn or τm, will the subsidy indeed be positive. This outcome,
in turn, requires a suﬃciently strong lock-in eﬀect.
In any case, the equilibrium levels (14) and (15) directly imply a positive subsidy






1 − 2F1(τn − τm)
F 0
1(τn − τm)
=: ∆τ > 0. (16)
Each government grants a higher subsidy to foreign investor than to domestic ones.
This preferential treatment reﬂects the initial home bias and corresponds to our
previous result (cf. tax diﬀerential (6)). Since investors respond less elastically to
subsidy changes at home than to those abroad, they receive less public support for
setting up their ﬁrms in their home country than for doing the same thing in the
other country.11
We have so far side-stepped the more technical topics of existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium. These issues are taken up in
Lemma 1 Tax and subsidy competition.
There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. This equilibrium is given by (5),
(6), (14), (15), and (16). Moreover, Ni = Nj = 1 results.
Proof: See Appendix. 
4 Net tax revenues and mobility
We now turn to our key issue, the relationship between mobility and net revenues.
To analyse the emerging links, we ﬁrst consider in more detail the net revenues in
equilibrium.
11Alternatively, the diﬀerential (16) can be explained in terms of hypothetical taxes.
124.1 Net tax revenues
Using the equilibrium values (5), (12), (14) and (15), each country’s net revenues
can be expressed as
NR =


















The revenues can be decomposed into two elements. First, the basic revenues give
the tax revenues that would occur in a country if no ﬁrm had been located there in
the ﬁrst period. In this case, all ﬁrms would be set up in the other country, but the
share F2(∆t) would relocate in the second period, generating revenue tm2F2(∆t).
Second, the revenue diﬀerential (rev diﬀ ) captures the additional revenues that arise
because some ﬁrms are initially set up in the respective country and thus pay higher
taxes due to the lock-in eﬀect.
The subsidy payments can also be split up into two components: First, the
hypothetical tax payments reﬂect the tax revenues that would result in the ﬁrst
period in the absence of any lock-in eﬀects. In the case of ∆t = 0, countries would
tax ﬁrms similarly in the two periods, as the optimality conditions (3) and (4) on
the one hand and (13) on the other hand show. The similarity becomes even more
evident if we express the hypothetical tax payments as ∆τ+2τmF1(∆τ) and compare
these formulation with revenues R.12
Second, there are hypothetical subsidy payments (hyp sub) that reduce these
hypothetical tax payments in order to attract ﬁrms. This second element – which
eventually gives rise to positive real subsidies – constitutes each government’s op-
portunity costs of attracting ﬁrms and generating the revenue diﬀerential. These
opportunity costs are, in equilibrium, equal to the revenue diﬀerential. That is, the
costs and beneﬁts of attracting ﬁrms exactly cancel out. We refer to this outcome as
the What-You-Give-Is-What-You-Get (WYGIWYG) principle. Taking WYGIWYG
into account, net revenues are
NR = 2t
mF2(∆t) + τ
n (1 − F1(∆τ)) + τ
mF1(∆τ). (18)
With this simple expression, investigating the impact of mobility on net revenues is
straightforward. We distinguish between increasing location mobility and increasing
relocation mobility. This distinction proves to be crucial.
12Using eqs. (14), (15) and (16), we can rearrange the hypothetical tax payments: τn (1 − F1)+
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Figure 3: Declining mobility costs and distribution functions
4.2 Net tax revenues and relocation mobility
In this section, we look at the implications of increasing relocation mobility for net
revenues. As already argued above, even ﬁrms that are well established in a country
are for various reasons becoming more and more mobile. In our model, the increase
of mobility comes as a reduction in the ﬁrms’ relocation costs. More speciﬁcally,
we capture the rise in mobility as a change in the value of the distribution function
F2(∆t;z2) in equilibrium (tn,tm) which is formally caused by a marginal increase in
a parameter z2. In particular, we start by considering
Scenario 1: dF2(∆t;z2)/dz2 > 0 and dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz2 = 0
at the ‘old’ equilibrium level ∆t. We stick, for convenience, to our notation F 0 =
∂F/∂∆t, F 00 = ∂2F/∂∆t2, etc. All derivatives with respect to the parameter z2 are
explicitly expressed as dF/dz2, etc.
Scenario 1 means that we consider an upward shift of the distribution curve that
leaves its slope, i.e., the density F 0
2, at the ‘old’ equilibrium level ∆t unaltered, as
illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The corresponding rise in mobility weakens the lock-in eﬀect.
Since established ﬁrms are more inclined to relocate and to respond more elastically
to international tax diﬀerentials, the old tax diﬀerential ∆t cannot be maintained.
In this sense, tax competition is intensiﬁed and erodes the revenue diﬀerential in
equation (17).
Nevertheless, this revenue diﬀerential is always identical in magnitude to the
hypothetical subsidy, as the WYGIWYG principle stresses. That is, any decline in
the revenue diﬀerential does not matter, since it is matched by an equal fall in sub-
14sidy payments. Attracting ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period is simply less beneﬁcial if these
ﬁrms are more mobile and pay fewer taxes in the second period. Consequently, sub-
sidy competition is reduced. All that ultimately matters is the impact of relocation













The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures the direct eﬀect of increasing mobility
in the second period. For given taxes tn and tm, the number of relocating ﬁrms
F2 (∆t;z2) rises, since the lock-in eﬀect is weakened. This positive eﬀect on country
i’s ‘basic’ tax base drives net revenues up.
The second term shows the indirect eﬀect of increasing relocation mobility through
the tax change in equilibrium. If the tax tn decreases (increases) with mobility pa-
rameter z2, revenues decline (further increase), thus counteracting (reinforcing) the
direct eﬀect. In general, the outcome is undetermined. The slope of the density
function – or, equivalently, the curvature of the distribution function – turns out to
be decisive, as Proposition 1 states more precisely.
Proposition 1 Net tax revenues and relocation mobility.
In scenario 1, the net revenues NR increase (decrease) with the ﬁrms’ mobility
parameter z2 if the density function’s slope F 00




R 0 ⇔ F
00




[1 − F2 (∆t;z2)]
:= γ2 < 0. (20)
Proof: See appendix. 
To understand the role of the density function’s slope, recall that the tax diﬀer-
ential drops in response to greater mobility. Consequently, the density F 0
2 increases
(decreases) at the new equilibrium tax diﬀerential if F 00
2 < 0 (F 00
2 > 0) holds. That
is, the tax base becomes more (less) elastic. This leads to lower (higher) taxes, as
a glance at the optimality conditions (3) and (4) and the equilibrium values (5)
shows. If the density function’s slope F 00
2 is below the critical value γ2, tax tn falls
so drastically that net revenues decline. By contrast, for moderately negative or
positive values of F 00
2 , net revenues rise.14
13Here, we made use of the envelope theorem, i.e., ∂Ri/∂tm
i = 0. Note that, considering NRi,
to be exact we have to read dtn as dtn
j in (19).
14Alternatively, the condition (20) can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of the elasticity εn:
dNR







∆t Q 1. The intuitive explanation for this relationship is as follows. The rise in
15In other words, net revenues NR increase with the mobility parameter z2 if
the distribution function is not too concave at the equilibrium levels tn and tm.
This condition is fulﬁlled, for instance, in the case of a uniform distribution, as our
following example illustrates.
Example: Mobility costs are assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e., Fk(mk) =
mk−mk
mk−mk and F 0
k(mk) = 1
mk−mk, where k = 1,2, m2 > m1 > 0 > m2 > m1, and mk >
|mk|. These relationships capture the fact that relocation costs exceed location costs,
and that investors are home biased and ﬁrms are locked in (since Fk(0) < 0.5 ⇔
mk > |mk|). They are consistent with assumption 1 and ﬁgure 1. In the current
example, of course, the two distribution curves are straight lines, with support
[m1,m1] and [m2,m2], respectively.






























The home bias of investors and the lock-in eﬀect that established ﬁrms experience
(implied by m1 > |m1| and m2 > |m2|, respectively) lead to preferential subsidy and
tax regimes in favour of foreign investors and ﬁrms.15 Using equilibrium taxes and




















Let us deﬁne mk = ωk − zk and mk = ωk − zk. Then, we can formally capture an
increase in relocation mobility, i.e., an decline in relocation costs, by an increase in
mobility dF2(∆t;z2)/dz2 > 0 increases the elasticity εn for given taxes and thus distorts the initial
equilibrium, as the ﬁrst-order condition (3) reveals. To restore the equilibrium, the tax tn has to
adjust the more, the less elastic the elasticity εn responds to changes in tn. If the elasticity of the
elasticity is suﬃciently small (i.e., below one), the tax tn declines so drastically that the indirect
eﬀect dominates, and the net revenues fall.
15Both subsidies, sn and sm, are indeed positive if m2 > 2m1 − m1 − m2 holds. In turn, if this
condition does not hold (but assumption 1 is still valid) we have the case of a tax holiday in a
narrow sense, i.e., tax rates are positive in both periods but relatively lower during period 1 when
the ﬁrm is established and higher later on in period 2.








Hence, a decrease in relocation costs, resulting in a higher relocation mobility, un-
ambiguously increases net revenues. 
Returning to our general discussion, we now take into account the fact that
changes in relocation mobility might also aﬀect the slope of the distribution function.
The additional eﬀects that arise if dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz 6= 0 holds at the ‘old’ equilibrium
level ∆t are stated in
Proposition 2 Net tax revenues and relocation mobility (continued).
The revenue increasing eﬀect of a marginal change in relocation mobility is reinforced
(counteracted) if dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz2 < 0 (dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz2 > 0) holds.
Proof: See appendix. 
The economic explanation for this conclusion is straightforward. If the density
F 0
2 decreases (increases) with the mobility parameter, the ﬁrms’ response to tax
increases becomes less (more) elastic, causing a rise (decline) in tax tn. Such a tax
change, however, increases (erodes) the basic revenues.
4.3 Net tax revenues and location mobility
Next, we investigate the implications of rising location mobility. That is, we analyse
the case in which investors are more mobile and less home biased when they decide
where their ﬁrms are set up in the ﬁrst period.
Analogously to scenario 1, we now consider
Scenario 2: dF1(∆τ;z1)/dz1 > 0 and dF 0
1(∆τ;z1)/dz1 = 0.
We formally express this scenario in terms of hypothetical taxes instead of sub-
sidies. The two interpretations are equivalent, since a rise in the hypothetical taxes
τn and τm corresponds with a decline in subsidies sn and sm of the same magnitude.
Referring to taxes, however, proves to be more convenient and allows us to compare
the diﬀerences between rising location and relocation mobilities more explicitly.
Increasing location mobility does not aﬀect future real taxes, but only current





















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side again reﬂects the direct impact of mobility
on the tax bases. In contrast to its counterpart in derivative (19), this eﬀect is
now negative. For given hypothetical taxes, and thus subsidies, increasing mobility
reduces the number of home ﬁrms located in each country 1 − F1 (∆τ;z1), but it
increases the number of foreign ﬁrms F1 (∆τ;z1) by the same amount. The impact
of these changes on net revenues is negative, since the former ﬁrms pay more hypo-
thetical taxes than the later ones. To put it diﬀerently, increasing mobility implies
that highly subsidised foreign investors who take advantage of the subsidy diﬀeren-
tial replace less subsidised home investors who set up their ﬁrms abroad, thereby
increasing each country’s overall subsidy payments.
The second and third term capture the indirect eﬀects of location mobility via
its inﬂuence on equilibrium taxes τn and τm. These indirect eﬀects are positive
(negative) if the hypothetical taxes τn and τm increase (decrease) and thus real
subsidies decline (rise).17 Only if the increase in taxes, and thus the decline in
subsidies, is suﬃciently large, will these indirect eﬀects overcompensate the negative
direct eﬀect and cause an increase in net revenues. Otherwise, net revenues fall.
Therefore, the overall impact on net revenues is not clear cut. The slope of the
density function, i.e., the curvature of the distribution function, again proves to be
crucial. This is not surprising, given the similarity between real and hypothetical
taxes.
Proposition 3 Net tax revenues and location mobility.
In scenario 2, the net revenues NR increase (decrease) with the investors’ mobility
parameter z1 if the density function’s slope F 00




R 0 ⇔ F
00
1 R




2[1 − F1 (∆τ;z1)]F1 (∆τ;z1)
=: γ1 > 0. (26)
Proof: See appendix. 
16We take advantage of the fact that ∂Ri/∂tn
i = 0 and ∂Ri/∂tm
i = 0 hold in equilibrium. Again,
considering NRi, to be exact we have to read dτn and dτm as dτn
j and dτm
j in (25).
17Analogously to scenario 1, we know that the hypothetical tax (or subsidy) diﬀerential (16)
decreases with mobility. The previous discrimination against home investors is simply no longer
viable once they become less attached to their home country. Depending on the curvature of the
distribution function, however, both taxes τn and τm might rise or fall, or τn falls and τm rises in
response to a larger location mobility.
18This conclusion mirrors our previous one. Now, net revenues NR decrease with
the mobility parameter z1 if the distribution function is not ‘too’ convex. That is,
the negative direct impact dominates as long as the rise in hypothetical taxes is
not ‘too’ drastic. In proposition 1, we stated that net revenues NR increase with
the mobility parameter z2 if the distribution function is not ‘too’ concave. That is,
the positive direct impact prevails as long as the decline in real taxes is not ‘too’
drastic.18
The sign of the direct eﬀect constitutes the major diﬀerence between the impact
of increasing location mobility and relocation mobility. This direct eﬀect is now
negative because, for given hypothetical taxes, hypothetical revenues from home
ﬁrms decline with location mobility. This negative eﬀect has no counterpart in the
case of changes in relocation mobility. Then, the revenue diﬀerential arising from
domestic ﬁrms (i.e., from ﬁrms that were already set up in the country considered)
anyway does not count because it is oﬀset by subsidy payments, as already stated
by the WYGIWYG principle. The ‘remaining’ direct eﬀect is thus positive in the
second period.
It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case dF 0
1(∆t;z1)/dz 6= 0.
Analogously to proposition 2, the revenue increasing eﬀect of a marginal change in
mobility is strengthened (weakened) if dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz2 < 0 (dF 0
2(∆t;z2)/dz2 > 0)
holds. Again, this conclusion reﬂects the fact that the tax base becomes less (more)
elastic, thereby pushing up (pushing down) hypothetical taxes.
Example (continued): Let us return brieﬂy to our example. In line with our argu-
mentation above, we now consider the impact of an increase in the location mobility,
i.e., an decline in location costs, captured by a marginal shift of the distribution
F1(m1) to the left. Formally, we analyse a marginal change in z1. Diﬀerentiating







Hence, a decline in location costs, resulting in a higher location mobility, unambigu-
ously lowers net tax revenues. 
5 Concluding Remarks
Governments compete for mobile ﬁrms with both subsidies and taxes. We have
analysed the resulting interplay between tax competition and subsidy competition,
18Analogously to proposition 1, condition (26) can alternatively be expressed in terms of elas-
ticities: dNR












ηm − 1) Q 0.
19leading to the WYGIWYG principle. That is, the additional revenues generated
by attracting ﬁrms through subsidies are exactly oﬀset by the opportunity costs
of these subsidies. This result has helped us to shed some light on the impact of
rising mobility on net tax revenues, thereby distinguishing between location mobility
and relocation mobility. Our key conclusion is that a rise in relocation mobility
increases net tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. A higher relocation mobility
reinforces tax competition, but weakens subsidy competition. Overall, the fall in
subsidy payments overcompensates for the decline in tax revenues, yielding higher
net tax revenues.
This conclusion is in sharp contrast to the common belief that increasing mobility
erodes national revenues – a belief that is backed by ‘pure’ tax competition models.
Notably, our contrasting conclusions are derived in a ‘conventional’ tax competition
framework, but in one that is supplemented by subsidy competition stages. In this
setting, we also argue that rising location mobility indeed reduces net tax revenues,
somewhat in line with the ‘conventional’ tax competition literature and common
beliefs.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. They directly imply that ﬁercer
tax competition (here, due to rising relocation mobility) might be advantageous
to the governments because of its feedback eﬀect on subsidy competition. In the
public debate, however, the focus is on weakening tax competition, or preventing
harmful tax competition, through various measures (cf. OECD, 1998). In our model,
weakening tax competition actually implies intensifying subsidy competition, with
potentially adverse eﬀects on net tax revenues. So an exclusive concentration on
tax harmonisation might be misleading and thus detrimental to future revenues. In
this sense, our paper cautions politicians against narrow minded tax harmonisation
on grounds diﬀerent from those previously discussed in the literature.19 Our paper
also indicates that more attention should be paid to subsidy competition and its
interaction with tax competition. Reducing subsidy competition might indeed be a
more successful avenue for larger tax revenues than restrictions on tax competition.
Exploring the implication of various forms of harmonisation and cooperation
in our framework in detail can be a promising extension of our analysis. Such an
extension would also include the discussion of limitations on preferential tax and
subsidy regimes – as far as such limitations are enforceable, given that subsidies
are frequently granted in form of somewhat hidden and indirect transfers, and even
preferential tax treatments are often hidden.20 As a further extension, the impact
19See, for instance, Zodrow (2003) for a survey on tax competition in the European Union and
the standard arguments against tax harmonisation.
20In the context of ‘pure’ tax competition, Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2008), Haupt and Peters
(2005), Janeba and Peters (1999), Janeba and Smart (2003) and Keen (2001) analyse preferential
20of correlated location and relocation costs could be checked. Firms might then sort
themselves according to their mobility characteristics, and multiple equilibria might
arise. Nevertheless, the underlying mechanisms explored in our simpliﬁed version
should remain the same, and our conclusions should therefore still be valid, perhaps
with some modiﬁcations.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 We start by analysing the second period equilibrium (third
and fourth stage). As argued above, this equilibrium is independent of the gov-
ernments’ subsidies (ﬁrst stage) and the investors’ initial location choice (second
stage). In step 1, we prove the existence and the characteristics of this equilibrium.
Uniqueness is proved in step 2. In step 3, we show that our lines of reasoning can
easily be repeated to prove existence, characteristics and uniqueness of the subsidy
competition equilibrium, and thus of the subgame perfect equilibrium.











































Ni = 0, (29)
implicitly deﬁne the governments’ continuous reaction functions Gn
i and Gm
j in the
case of an interior solution, since, ﬁrst, the second-order conditions
∂2Ri
∂(tn























Ni < 0, (31)
are fulﬁlled for all taxes that constitute a solution to (28) and (29) according to
assumption 1 (vi) and, second, F is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function.
23Obviously, negative taxes can never be revenue maximising so that we can fo-











Ni > 0 and ∂NRi/∂tn
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j +m2 = −tn
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2(m2) < 0, implying 0 < tm
j = Gm
j (tn
i ) < tn
i − m2. (We implicitly assume that
the ﬁrms’ gross returns π are suﬃciently large so that they do not constrain govern-
ment taxation.)
In addition, the unique intersection between the reaction curve Gn
i and the ‘tn
i =
tm
j ’-line and the unique intersection between the reaction curve Gm
j and the ‘tn
i = tm
j ’-
line are characterised by tn
i |tm
j =tn










respectively. From these unique intersections, Gn
i (tm
j ) > 0 for all tm
j ≥ 0 and
Gm
j (tn
i ) > 0 for all tn
i ≥ 0 follow that Gn
i (tm
j ) R tm
j ⇔ tm
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(which results form F2(0) < 0.5, see assumption 1 (i)), and given the
upper and lower boundaries of the taxes as explored above, we can conclude: (i)
there exists at least one equilibrium, (ii) tn > tm ∈ (0,[1 − F2(0)]/F 0
2(0)) and thus
tn < [1 − F2(0)]/F 0
2(0)+m2 hold in equilibrium, and (iii) taxes are characterised by
(5) and thus (6).
Step 2 (Uniqueness) As taxes are given by (5), the tax diﬀerential is characterised
by (6), or equivalently by ∆t − [1 − 2F2(∆t)]/F 0
2(∆t) = 0. This tax diﬀerential
is positive (see step 1 and remarks in footnote 10). To show that it is uniquely
determined, we diﬀerentiate the term [1 − 2F2(∆t)]/F 0
2(∆t) =: Φ(∆t) with respect
to ∆t, leading to
∂ {[1 − 2F2(∆t)]/F 0
2(∆t)}
∂∆t
< 0 ⇔ F
00






The latter inequality is fulﬁlled, since F 00
2 (∆t) > −2[F 0
2(∆t)]
2 /[1 − F2(∆t)] holds by
assumption 1 (vi) and −2[F 0
2(∆t)]
2 /[1 − F2(∆t)] ≥ −2[F 0
2(∆t)]
2 /[1 − 2F2(∆t)] ⇔
F2(∆t) ≥ 0 results. Thus, the term [1 − 2F2(∆t)]/F 0
2(∆t) continuously decreases
with ∆t, with Φ(0) = [1 − 2F2(0)]/F 0
2(0) > 0 (see assumption 1 (iii)) and Φ(m2) =
−1/F 0
2(m2) < 0 (see assumption 1 (i)). Also, in the interval [0,m2] the term ∆t
is obviously continuously increasing from 0 to m2. As a consequence of the in-
termediate value theorem, the tax diﬀerential ∆t is then uniquely determined by
∆t − [1 − 2F2(∆t)]/F 0
2(∆t) = 0 or (6), and so are then the taxes tn
A = tn
B = tn and
tm
A = tm
B = tm by (5).
Step 3 (Subsidy Competition and Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium) The ﬁrst-order




































j ) = 0, (34)
where (12), the deﬁnitions τn
i := (tn − tm) − sn
i and τm
i := (tn − tm) − sm
i , and (16)
are used. The similarity between (33) and (34) on the one hand and (28) and (29)
on the other hand is striking. Not surprisingly, the proof of existence, characteristics
and uniqueness of the subsidy competition equilibrium follows the lines of reasoning
explored in step 1 and 2, which need not to be repeated here. The hypothetical taxes
τn
i and τm
i are independent of the second period equilibrium. The only impact of
the second period equilibrium on the ﬁrst period equilibrium is that the taxes tn and
tm raise the resulting subsidies sn and sm by the tax diﬀerential ∆t. The symmetric
nature of the framework and the resulting equilibrium imply Ni = Nj = 1.
Consequently, we can conclude that (i) there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium which is characterised by (5), (6), (14), (15), (16), and Ni = Nj = 1.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Preliminary Results Inserting the optimal taxes (5), (14) and (15) into the















































































25is the elasticity of the density function F 0
2(∆t;z2) with respect to changes in the
tax diﬀerential ∆t. Note that derivative (39) follows from tax diﬀerential (6)
and the associated comparative statics: d∆t/dz2 = −(∂g2/∂z2)/(∂g2/∂∆t), where
g2(∆t;z2) := ∆t − [1 − 2F2(∆t;z2)]/F 0
2(∆t;z2) and ∂g2/∂∆t = 3 + ρ2.
We can prove propositions 1 and 2 in a more convenient and shorter manner by
making use of the derivatives (36)-(39) instead of the more intuitive derivative (19)
and the tedious comparative statics that leads to dtn/dz2.
Proposition 1 We now consider scenario 1 with ∂F2(∆t;z2)/∂z2 > 0 and
∂F 0
2(∆t;z2)/∂z2 = 0 at the equilibrium value of ∆t, which simpliﬁes the derivatives
(37) and (39). Inserting (37), (38) and (39) into derivative (36) and rearranging the



















2 (3 + ρ2)
#
R 0, (41)
where the functions’ argument ∆t and parameter z2 are suppressed for notational
convenience. The sign of this derivative depends on the terms in the square brackets,
since all other terms are positive. Rearranging the terms in the square brackets and
using (40) result in relation (20) from proposition 1.
Proposition 2 To calculate the additional impact of a change in the mobility
parameter z2 on the net tax revenues NR that arises if ∂F 0
2(∆t;z2)/∂z2 > 0, we
evaluate the derivatives (37) and (39) for ∂F2(∆t;z2)/∂z2 = 0 and ∂F 0
2(∆t;z2)/∂z2 >





























where we again suppress the functions’ argument ∆t and parameter z2. Recall









holds, which is assumed to be the case by as-
sumption 1 (vi). Then, F 00
2 < 2(F 0
2)
2 /F2 implies that 2(F 0
2)
2 F2 − (F2)
2 F 00
2 > 0
holds. Also, F 00
2 > −2(F 0
2)
2 /(1 − F2) implies that the inequality 3 + ρ2 > 3 −
2[(1 − 2F2)/(1 − F2)] > 1 is fulﬁlled, where we use (40). Finally, F2 < 0.5 and
thus 1−2F2 > 0 hold in equilibrium (see tax diﬀerential (6) and the explanation in








which proves Proposition 2.
26Proof of Proposition 3 This proof follows along the lines of the previous reason-
ing. Now, equilibrium net tax revenues (35) are aﬀected by a change in the mobility












We consider scenario 2; that is, dF1(∆τ;z1)/dz1 > 0 and dF 0
1(∆τ;z1)/dz1 = 0 hold





















































is the elasticity of the density function F 0
1(∆τ;z1) with respect to changes in the
diﬀerential ∆τ. Analogously to (39), derivative (47) follows from diﬀerential (16)
and the respective comparative statics: d∆τ/dz1 = −(∂g1/∂z1)/(∂g1/∂∆τ), where
g1(∆τ;z1) := ∆τ − [1 − 2F1(∆τ;z1)]/F 0
1(∆τ;z1) and ∂g1/∂∆τ = 3 + ρ1.
































where we make use of elasticity (48) and, for notational convenience, omit the func-
tions’ argument ∆τ and parameter z1. Note that F 00
1 > −2(F 0
1)
2 /(1 − F1) holds
according to assumption 1 (vi) – otherwise the second-order condition would not be
fulﬁlled. Thus, the inequality 3+ρ1 > 3−2[(1 − 2F1)/(1 − F1)] > 1 results, where
we use (48). Since F 0
1 and ∂F1/∂z1 are also positive, the quotient outside the square
brackets is deﬁnitely negative. The overall sign of (49) then depends on the terms
in the brackets. Rearranging them leads to condition (26) in Proposition 3.
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